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CCP response to Ofwat’s emerging strategy: Driving transformational innovation in 
the sector 
The authors welcome the opportunity to respond to this Ofwat consultation on collaborative 
innovation and the financial support targeted for it. We agree with Ofwat that a collaborative 
culture and financial ability are important factors driving innovation in the water sector. 
Collaborations between companies that are competitors are relatively rare in managing 
common-pool resources such as water. This response primarily offers learnings from a 
collaborative collective action among competing companies in Canada’s oil sands in 2012 
(with water as one of the environmental priority areas), to shed light on some organisational 
rules underpinning such relationship and collaboration. We do also reflect on the financial 
mechanisms that Ofwat suggest for driving innovation, as well as consider the role and 
importance of regulation.  
 
1. Main barriers to innovation in the sector 
A major difference between water and other utility sectors is that the appointed water 
companies in England and Wales are regional monopolies and household water consumers 
cannot change their water suppliers. As a result, the inherent incentive for companies to 
innovate and compete over customers is absent in the sector. This partly explains the high-
risk aversion of water companies towards innovation, as noted by Ofwat. While investment 
increased after privatisation, there has been a reduction in centralised R&D spending.1 
Innovation also requires a supportive culture among different parties in the sector. Plausibly, 
because they are regional monopolies, water companies may consider themselves as self-
contained and thus do not explore the possibility of synergistic benefits that would provide 
value to water consumers beyond their own geographic areas. Moreover, the geographical 
distances between regional companies mean that where policies of good practice are 
achieved, this might be less visible to other companies. Without the right incentives or a clear 
mechanism or framework in place to share information effectively, this could be problematic.  
Regulatory regimes further influence the degree of innovation. Ofwat uses comparative 
benchmarking to assess the performance of water companies. While this does not necessarily 
render collaborative innovation impossible, proper framework and incentive mechanisms 
need to be in place to ensure collaborations with competitors drive good outcomes for both 
innovation and competition. For example, we want to encourage companies that must deal 
with problems around water scarcity to collaborate in order to find better solutions to deal 
with leakage. However, given that Ofwat rank companies in terms of their water leakage 
efficiency (amongst other things), there needs to be an incentive framework in place that 
ensures companies are willing to share innovations that might help their competitors’ 
improve their rank.   
As the case study below suggests, the broader or more “global” an innovation, the more 
difficult it can be to get companies to agree to work collaboratively.  
                                                          
1 Amodu T, Ennis S and Waddams Price C (2019), CCP response to National Infrastructure Commission: The future 
of regulation. 
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2. Collaborative innovation initiatives – learnings from a case study 
Collaborations between companies that are competitors are relatively rare but have the 
potential to generate high syncretic rents. Bowen et al.2 examine Canada’s Oil Sands 
Innovation Alliance (COSIA) established in 2012 between twelve major competing companies 
in the Alberta oil sands. This research moved beyond studying “coordinated” actions (which 
commonly sees organisations agreeing on rules and acting to certify decisions independently) 
to “collaborative” actions where there is sharing of resources and technologies and is much 
more effective in managing common-pool resources.  
The proposal to stimulate innovation proposed by Ofwat in this consultation (i.e. innovation 
competition and end-of-period innovation roll-out reward), differs from COSIA which was a 
collective action to share intellectual property and collaborate on developing new technology 
to improve the industry’s environmental performance, such as priorities on tailings, water 
and greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, we consider the learnings on the organising rules that 
were developed to manage the relationship and collaboration highly relevant for the 
proposed innovation initiatives by Ofwat.  
Similar to Ofwat’s proposal on setting up a single independent expert entity and a joint 
framework underpinning funding criteria and ways to share information among water 
companies, COSIA members developed a set of formal agreements. Specifically, they agreed 
to:   
 Allow firms to choose the projects that they wish to contribute to (instead of each 
company undertaking projects independently or all companies participating in all 
projects), knowing that all project outcomes will be shared with all members;  
 Ensuring that any technology shared within the initiative would not be applied 
elsewhere (e.g. other countries or regions3); 
 Determining whether a particular project is within the scope of each issue concerned. 
The set of organising rules used to govern shared activities were central to the outcomes of 
collaborations; they took considerable time to negotiate and evolved considerably over the 
course of negotiation. In particular, Bowen et al. (2018) found that the set of rules varied 
with the scale of the environmental issue concerned. Companies took a shorter period of 
time to negotiate and generate more innovation projects when the issue was relatively small-
scale and of local relevance, whereas both negotiation and outcomes were less effective 
when the issue is large-scale and of global relevance. For example, regarding greenhouse 
gases, COSIA failed to make technology/intellectual property shareable beyond the project 
team, as companies did not wish to share technology that was central to their competitive 
advantage outside of the Alberto region.  
To help visualise these learnings, we have included two tables at the end of this consultation 
taken from Bowen et. al’s case paper. Table 1 shows how the organising rules within COSIA 
                                                          
2 Bowen F, E. Bansal, P. and Slawinski, N. (2018) Scale matters: The scale of environmental issues in corporate 
collective actions, Strategic Management Journal, 39, 1411-1436. 
3 Oil companies compete in a market where there is a tradable, global price for the commodity; water is not 
traded.  
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were drawn up. Table 2 provides a summary of the three environmental priority areas, their 
issue scale, how organising rules were applied by COSIA and what outcomes resulted from 
the collaboration. Finally, Figure 1 shows the model of collaborative collective action for 
common pool resources.  
 
Applying case study learnings to Ofwat’s proposal  
a) There may be lessons from the COSIA example in terms of how water companies go about 
developing the framework that underpins their innovations. The case study provides some 
understanding about why agreements were successfully formed, and why others (often 
much broader in scope) failed. Getting the framework right and allowing for different scales 
of size to emerge allowed companies to identify where they would be willing to collaborate 
most effectively, and share the lessons of innovations to all members.   
b) Closest to the current Ofwat consultation, the issue on water pollution and freshwater 
usage faced by COSIA is categorised as “mid-scale”. It took 12 months for companies to agree 
on the set of organising rules. The scoping rule was the main challenge in the negotiation 
because once in scope, the associated outcomes need to be shared with COSIA. In the end, 
the emphasis was placed on environmental rather than cost-reduction technologies, and 
technologies at the surface level (upgrading, water treatment and metering) were deemed 
in scope, whereas those at the subsurface level were not. However, the scope was considered 
broad enough to improve the issues concerned.  
c) Approaches to sharing and disseminating information, including arrangements on 
intellectual property, can be a crucial pre-requisite for collaboration. When it came to COSIA, 
the framework allowed companies to opt-in to projects they wanted to rather than working 
independently. This incentivised those most motivated and in the best position to collaborate 
to do so. It also avoided forcing all companies to participate because they were aware that 
lessons would be shared with all members.  
For instance, water companies that deal with specific issues in their region such as water 
scarcity will be motivated to look into solutions and technologies that deal with this problem, 
whereas those companies working in regions that do not have this issue would be less 
concerned. This might include regions that must deal with too much water as well as those 
that might have average rainfall but could still benefit from the lessons learned through an 
innovation project. The COSIA study showed that specific scale issues allowed for a much 
broader scope of learning because companies were not concerned. This could mean that 
companies that do not necessarily prioritise developing technology to deal with water 
scarcity but are still affected by it to some extent would be most likely to benefit from well-
developed innovation.  
 
3. Mechanisms for financial support 
The approach of recovering the funding of £200m is similar to the approach that Ofwat uses 
to determine how much each company pays for its licence fee. Moreover, the roll-out reward 
seems to be consistent with Ofwat’s outcomes-based regulatory regime operated since 2014. 
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It is worth noting that outcome-based rewards may lead companies to be risk-averse in the 
innovations that they undertake if what constitutes “successful” outcomes is too narrowly 
defined. Often innovative products can fail and there would need to be a framework in place 
that allows companies to take risks on innovations that may not work out but not penalised 
by a poorly designed outcome-based reward system.  
On the other end of the scale, innovation need not be entirely new technology or approach; 
novel and effective combinations of existing measures for improvement are part of 
innovation, which might be associated with a relatively lower risk. Ofwat may need to make 
it clearer about what they mean by “transformational innovation”, and ascertain what they 
will deem possible within the defined timeframe 2020-2025, especially on innovative 
products in the early stages of development. With this said, if the bar is set too low, one 
might wonder whether companies should have been dealing with particular issues as a 
matter of good practice, rather than tapping into the fund. Ofwat does address this when 
referring to the risks posed by companies using additional funding when projects should be 
incentivised under the current price review framework.  
In terms of incentivising collaboration, one thing we might draw attention to is the idea of a 
conditional collective bonus, which has had some success in improving farmers’ participation 
in an agricultural environment scheme (EAS)4. The “choice experiment” encouraged 
winegrowers in France to enrol their land into an environmental scheme. Normally, farmers 
are just paid on an individual basis to enrol their land into these measures, though uptake 
has been low especially where more environmental effort is needed. The collective bonus 
(an additional payment) works by making a conditional bonus dependent on the basis that a 
group of farmers in their area collectively enrol enough of their land into the scheme to 
trigger the bonus. The authors demonstrated the success of the collective bonus in increasing 
participation, bringing down the price per hectare of land enrolled and in overcoming the 
difficulties that farmers were often too reluctant to make a collective commitment that made 
them too dependent on others’ decisions.  
Ofwat may explore whether this type of incentivisation could help get companies to enrol 
into innovations that might normally be dismissed because of risk aversion. Rewarding 
companies for being collectively tackling environmental issues through innovation may help 
overcome the perception of free-riding by other companies. It would also provide some 
flexibility in how payments can be made to companies for their innovations.  
 
4. The role of regulation  
The approach set out by Ofwat of developing the framework underpinning innovation 
competition by getting water companies to jointly develop some of the framework’s detail 
for review/approval by Ofwat seems sensible. As Bowen et al’s case study of COASIA shows, 
however, getting companies to agree to frameworks for developing more ambitious 
innovations can be time-consuming and had a higher degree of failure.  
                                                          
4 Kuhfuss L., Préget R., Thoyer S. & Hanley N. (2016)  “Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental 
schemes: the role of a collective bonus”  European Review of Agricultural Economics 43 (4), 609–636, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbv031 
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More generally, we would agree that Ofwat should take appropriate strategic control or 
oversight over processes and decisions, especially when considering the barriers to 
innovation that has been set out earlier. Ofwat should consider the key role that regulation 
can play in any scheme, not least because inaction to deal with environmental strain will have 
severe knock-on effects. One study5 has assessed a panel of OECD countries who have 
implemented a wide range of environmental policies that aim to improve environmental 
conditions. The paper demonstrates that with respect to environmental policy, higher levels of 
regulatory stringency (set by regulators in “high regulation” countries) actually benefitted the 
overall productivity of industries. Productive firms benefitted from a short-run increase in 
productivity growth, whereas least productive firms suffered: this suggests that industry overall 
benefitted from the exit of least productive firms in the market.  
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Table 1.  Organizing rules within COSIA  
Rule Description Illustrative Quotations 
Joint 
Industry 
Projects 
(“JIPs”) 
Allowed firms to 
choose on 
which sub-
issues to work, 
and all COSIA 
members would 
benefit from 
outcomes 
 “JIPs, joint industry projects – we can have all seven companies… or you’ll have a subset or you can have just one, an 
independent project. But the JIPs are the actual projects” (Tailings EPA member) 
 “Two or three or five of however many companies can form a joint industry project, which will have its own agreement, do that 
work together, co-fund it and then contribute the results of that work to the [EPA] as well” (Water EPA member) 
 “We hope that each JIP might have two or three or six companies involved… certainly not every one will have all twelve 
companies involved. And, you actually don’t want that. You kind of prefer to keep the groups small, let them run with it. The  
other companies get to share the technology anyway if it’s a winner. And, if it’s not a winner, well, that’s useful information too 
because it might be something that they… would have pursued if it hadn’t been proven unsuccessful” (COSIA leadership team) 
 “Because of the mandatory requirement to share everything that’s developed in the alliance, a company doesn’t have to be part 
of every single JIP. In the past you had to be part of 10 JIPS in order to get the intellectual property and use it. Now you only 
have to be part of one. You can trust your alliance colleagues to go forward and lead and produce results in 9 other JIPs because 
you get results back. So it can decrease the amount of effort you have to give for the same amount of gain again by an order of 
magnitude.” (COSIA leadership team) 
Field of 
use 
Stipulated that 
any technology 
developed 
within COSIA 
was for use only 
in the Canadian 
oil sands 
 “The other thing we’ve done is we’ve taken pains to make sure that the sharing aspects of this technology is very tightly limited 
to what we call ‘field of use’. So it has to be oil sands only in Canada. So, if a technology is developed inside of the EPA, 
everybody gets to share it; but, they only get to share it inside of Canada on oil sands” (COSIA leadership team) 
 “But at the end of the project you still get the intellectual property that resulted from the project but only to apply in the field of 
use.  But if you’re interested in it for global then you have to let the contamination aspect go and join.” (Greenhouse Gases  EPA 
member) 
 “And what we were saying is we can be your competitor… in Amman and Abu Dhabi but you’re not going to be our competitor 
for water in the oil sands.” (Greenhouse Gases EPA member)  
Scoping Each EPA 
decided which 
technologies 
would be 
considered out 
of scope – 
usually, cost-
reduction 
technologies 
 “We’re trying to figure out what do we want to collaborate on, you know, what’s the extent of the scope and what are the 
contractual arrangements and commercial agreements that we have to sort of set up before we can start engaging” (Water 
EPA member) 
 “So some companies at the table wanted a very broad scope and other companies wanted a very narrow scope, and the 
process was put in place in December to breakdown or understand all the reasons… Was it contamination reasons, business 
opportunities reasons, competitive law reasons? And once we understood what the reasons were then we were able to 
build solutions to address those concerns and broaden the scope to a point where every company at the table was 
comfortable with it” (Greenhouse Gases EPA member) 
 “One aspect is the scope of what we’re dealing with. It tries to take that spectrum of technologies that are not competitive 
but have environmental impact to ones that are highly competitive and don’t have an environmental impact, and then 
there’s everything in between… We had to draw a circle for companies to be able to be prepared to lend access to anything 
they’re for in that scope.” (COSIA leadership team) 
(from Bowen, Bansal & Slawinski, 2018, p.1419)  
 
Table 2. Environmental issues, organizing rules and outcomes within each environmental priority area (EPA) 
 Tailings EPA Water EPA Greenhouse Gases EPA 
 
Issue scale 
Issue extent Local 
Confined to oil sands production 
area 
Regional 
Three river basins were affected: the 
Athabasca, Beaver and Peace River Basins 
Global 
Greenhouse gas emissions from the oil sands 
affected the global carbon cycle  
Interconnectedness Low 
Environmental impacts discrete and 
relatively contained 
Medium 
Water quality impacts biodiversity, habitat 
and wildlife across the watershed area 
High 
Climate change also affects other global and long-
term issues including ocean acidification, weather 
events, habitat changes, food security 
 
Organizing rules as applied within each EPA 
Joint Industry Projects 
 
Widely shared 
Companies joined the projects they 
wanted, and shared technology/IP 
among all EPA members 
Widely shared 
Companies joined the projects they wanted, 
and shared technology/IP among all EPA 
members 
Not widely shared 
Greenhouse Gases was the only EPA where only 
those companies that participated in a project 
benefitted from the technology/IP 
Field of use No concerns with IP mobility 
Limiting technologies to Canadian 
oil sands was not of concern, given 
that developed technologies could 
only be commercially applied to the 
Alberta oil sands 
Some concerns with IP mobility 
Limiting technologies to Canadian oil sands 
presented some concerns, because techs 
could be applied in other jurisdictions. But it 
was possible to limit some types of 
technology development to the region 
Significant concerns with IP mobility 
Limiting technologies to the Canadian oil sands 
presented significant concerns, because techs 
developed to reduce greenhouse gases could be 
transferred to, and create equivalent benefits in, 
other competitive arenas globally 
 Scoping 
 
Broad 
Scope remained broad.  All 
companies agreed to share IP on 
reclamation, even if it was 
potentially cost-reducing 
Somewhat broad 
Scope of EPA was broad enough to include 
water at the surface level, even if it was 
considered cost-reducing. Subsurface water 
(incl. steam) was deemed out of scope 
Narrow 
Scope of EPA became very narrow and limited to 
environmental technologies and excluding cost-
reducing technologies to ensure all companies 
signed on 
 
Outcomes 
Time to agreement 8 months (October 2012) 12 months (March 2013) 19 months (September 2013) 
Investment 
   Technologies shared*  117 technologies, $401m 171 technologies, $232m 124 technologies, $232m 
   Projects completed*  100 projects, $626m 26 projects, $12m 12 projects, $2m 
   Active projects*  42 projects, $75m 43 projects, $231m 26 projects, $15m 
Project range Addressed issue scale 
e.g. reclamation technologies 
Addressed issue scale 
E.g. Regional Water Solutions 
Did not address issue scale 
e.g. Carbon Capture and Storage 
* by November 2014, approximately a year after the end of our formal data collection. Source: COSIA Performance Update 
(from Bowen, Bansal & Slawinski, 2018, p.1421)
Figure 1. A Model of Collaborative Collective Action for Common Pool Resources  
 
(from Bowen, Bansal & Slawinski, 2018, p.1428) 
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